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In the search of the causes of the worldwide recession that began in the U.S. in 2007 
and reached Germany a year later, the main focus was on the crisis in the financial 
system with its roots in an overheated real estate and housing market. Another more 
structural cause is seen in the global imbalances that evolved in the past decade and 
that are reflected by rising asymmetries of the current accounts of some global 
players. How is this phenomenon linked to the real estate and financial crisis in the 
U.S.? Is there a link that is responsible for these asymmetries? Some authors argue 
that East Asian current account surpluses are responsible for U.S. current account 
deficit (Dooley/Folkerts-Landau/Garber 2003, Bernanke 2005) because the East 
Asian countries keep their exchange rate artificially undervalued, for instance by 
pegging it to the dollar. Their goal is to promote export-led growth. This feeds over-
consumption in the U.S. Other authors argue the other side and are more focused on 
fiscal and monetary policy. Rising deficits in large countries such as the U.S. are 
producing rising surpluses in an increasing number of periphery countries, including 
China (Schnabl/Freitag 2009:14). According to these authors, fiscal and monetary 
policies in the U.S. are among the main factors causing the global asymmetries.1   
 
1. The analytical framework 
 
To avoid the over-simplifying terminology of a center and its periphery, every country 
that trades internationally is called a global player. A few have large economies with 
strong international trade and financial markets providing internationally used 
currencies in the world monetary system. By now and in the foreseeable future, the 
U.S. dollar is the leading international currency. International trade and capital flows 
are denominated mostly in the U.S. dollar. Backed by the large size of U.S. goods 
and financial markets, the dollar is the dominant international medium of exchange, 
unit of account, and store of value in the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. There are different reasons why other 
countries and private international agents accept the dollar as common international 
money; they include low transaction costs, ubiquity, and higher stability compared to 
their own currency.  
 
Since the euro was created, its international role has been steadily increasing not 
only in Europe, but also beyond. From this point of view and taking into account the 
dimension of its international trade, the European Monetary Union (EMU) can be 
regarded as another important actor in the global economy. To mark the difference 
between the leading country and the other global players we see the U.S. as a global 
                                                                  
* I thank the members of the research group “Politik und Wirtschaft” (www.forschungsseminar.de) for 
useful comments. 
1 With few exceptions, the first paragraphs summarise the author’s shared views with Schnabl/Freitag 
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player exerting hegemony (Mansfield 1994:272) and define the U.S. as the leader. 
The rest of the global players are challengers. According to the literature, the EMU 
and its currency can be regarded as one of the challengers of the U.S.’s role in the 
world economy (Chinn and Frankel 2005). In spite of the fact that China, a large and 
rapidly growing economy with strong international trade, is pegging its currency to the 
U.S. dollar, it is a global player that also can be called a challenger because its 
monetary policy can be changed at any time in the future.  
I do not raise the question here of whether there are or have been other challengers 
in the global economy such as Russia or Japan; for the special purpose of this 
analysis it is sufficient to focus on the leader and one or two of its challengers. To 
make the picture more clear cut in terms of a nation-state framework, the analysis 
treats the EMU as being represented by its economically leading country, Germany. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) acts independently from any member state of the 
EMU. Therefore in this analysis, the EMU is financially represented by the ECB and 
economically by Germany. This is a simplification, but it plays no crucial role in the 
discussion of my leading question: Can the global imbalances be explained by the 
macroeconomic policy of the U.S. as it is done by Schnabl and Freitag?    
 
2. The main actors  
 
2.1. United States 
 
The U.S. is (as is the EMU) a large and—in the view of Schnabl and Freitag 
(2009:8)—a comparatively closed economy. As a matter of fact, the trade openness 
(Suzuki/Krause 2005) in 2004 was 0.31 in the U.S., 0.65 in China, and 0.71 in 
Germany. Monetary decisions made by the Federal Reserve (Fed) are based first on 
domestic targets such as growth and financial and price stability, even though 
authorities may feel the burden of responsibility connected with having an 
international currency (see Chinn/Frankel 2005:7,11-12). By and large, it may be 
legitimate to classify macroeconomic policies in the U.S. of the past decade as being 
expansionary (Schnabl/Freitag 2009:4), but this assessment ignores the period from 
2004 to 2006 which is characterized by rising interest rates in reaction to the 
overheating of the domestic market. External targets of macroeconomic policy such 
as export competitiveness are regarded as secondary by the Fed and the exchange 
rate is being left to free floating. With two short exceptions among the past 18 years 
the two prosperous phases of the U.S. economy are accompanied by a rising current 
account deficit. What was the cause of the deficit? The authors give a very vague 
answer to this question: “Low interest rates and buoyant domestic activity are likely to 
contribute to rising imports and increasing current account deficits” (Schnabl/Freitag 
2009:15-16.) Why did the flourishing economy of the U.S. not lead to rising exports 
and increasing current account surpluses like in Germany? According to a widely 
shared point of view the answer is this—exports are a cause of a flourishing economy 
instead of an effect. But imports can be regarded this way. Therefore, the account 
deficit of the U.S. economy is mostly homemade, caused by an overheated 
consumption, in spite of the fact that the staggering demand in the rapidly developing 
countries may be one of the causes for lagging exports. Another explanation refers to 
the increasing food and raw material prices that contributed to the rising current 
account surplus of countries with this kind of exports (Schnabl/Freitag 2009:18-19), 
but only from 2008 onward and less valid for trading partners China and Europe.  
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2.2. Europe  
 
The euro was introduced in 1999 and has gained importance as a regional 
international currency. It was backed by the substantial size of European goods and 
financial markets. The euro is used for payment transactions within the EMU and as 
a vehicle currency between EMU members and non-EMU countries. Some countries 
with institutional links to the EMU have redirected their exchange rate strategies to 
the euro (Lithuania, Bulgaria). Foreign reserves are increasingly held in euro-
denominated assets (e.g., Russia). According to ECB (2008), private and public 
agents have increased the use of the euro for their international transactions. Like in 
the U.S., the macroeconomic policy of the EMU is designed to meet domestic targets 
such as price stability, growing output and financial stability, first, but these are supra-
national targets. External targets such as exchange rate stability and export 
competitiveness are regarded as secondary. Therefore, exchange rate is left as free 
floating. Macroeconomic policies in the euro area tended to be more restrictive than 
the Fed, because of the priority of price stability. The aggregated current account of 
the euro area has been balanced by and large. Some members of the EMU such as 
Greece and Spain have experienced increasing deficits. If we focus to Germany as 
the economic leader of the EMU, her current account has increased since 2001.  
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Fig.1: Germany’s quarterly current account, in billion €. 
 
2.3. China 
 
China has a big and rapidly growing economy with emerging markets and it has 
tended to run account surpluses since 1996. There are several reasons why China 
pursues a soft peg of its currency to the dollar. China still has underdeveloped capital 
markets; pegging to the dollar provides stable conditions for China’s export 
dependent industrial sector, it secures a loss-free recycling of the revenues 
generated in dollars abroad, and it is attractive to foreign investors. An appreciation 
of a currency is an appropriate measure in the case of an increasing current account 
surplus, but this would worsen the conditions of exports and erode the value of 
international assets in terms of the Renminbi (“the People's currency” with its unit 
“Yuan”). On the other hand, there is the danger of importing inflation of the dollar. 
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Soft pegs allow for a restricted kind of exchange rate flexibility. A slow process of 
appreciation of the Yuan has been underway since 2004 (see Fig.2). 
 
3. The Asymmetries  
 
The exchange rate policies of the three global players, the U.S., EMU, and China, 
generates three relationships characterized in two types: the (almost) constant rate 
between China and the U.S. as a consequence of China’s pegging to the dollar is 
contrasted by a flexible rate between the euro and the dollar and between the euro 
and the Yuan. To summarize the asymmetries between the current accounts of the 
three big global players, the international position of the U.S. economy is 
characterized by a rising deficit, while the EMU (Germany) and China show rising 
surpluses. This generates increasing pressure on the Yuan being appreciated 
compared to the dollar, while appreciation of the euro has been steady since its 
introduction. Looking at the macroeconomic policy behaviour, the U.S. tended to be 
as expansionary as China, while the EMU had more restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
 
3.1. Monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies  
 
In the Mundell-Fleming framework, flexible exchange rates are dampening the 
effectiveness of an expansionary fiscal policy due to increases of the interest rate 
and the tendency to an appreciation of the currency. According to the AS-AD model, 
fiscal expansion aimed to stimulate a staggering economy is more effective when it is 
supported by a monetary expansion that keeps domestic interest rates low and 
softens appreciation pressure. Such a rare coordination of macroeconomic policies is 
one of the standard examples in macroeconomic textbooks (Blanchard/Illing 
2004:155-156). It also can be supposed to be the case in China, because there is no 
clear institutional separation between the government and central bank. The EMU 
countries are much more restricted in their scope to carry out discretionary fiscal 
policies because (i) the ECB is independent from the expectations of the member-
states of the EMU and bound to pursue first and foremost price stability; and (ii) the 
legal limits for government deficits supposed by the Maastricht treaty.     
 
3.2. The redirection thesis 
 
The consequence of dollar or euro pegs is mirrored by the asset side of the central 
bank’s balance sheets. Foreign reserves are the most important item that builds the 
basis for reserve money creation. “Claims on government and on the private sector 
play only a marginal role for reserve money creation. From a long-term perspective, 
when output grows the necessary increase in reserve money is via the accumulation 
of foreign reserves” (Schnabl/Freitag 2009:11). This is the background for the 
hypothesis by the authors in the scheme of a center and periphery of the global 
economy: “As a result interest rates in periphery countries are dependent on the 
monetary policy of the centers. If interest rates in the center decline, capital flows are 
redirected towards the peripheries, and the currency of the periphery country 
appreciates. To keep the exchange rate stable, foreign reserves are accumulated 
and reserve money expands” (Schnabl/Freitag 2009:11.). 
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3.3. Claiming a causal link 
 
The redirection of capital flows from the U.S. to China which is supposed to be 
triggered by declining interest rates of the Fed is the central argument delivered by 
Schnabl and Freitag: “…the direction of causality matters. Are the complementary 
trends in global imbalances driven by the centers or the peripheries?” 
(Schnabl/Freitag 2009:13). Contrary to the view of others who see a causality running 
from East Asia to the U.S., the authors hypothesise, “We assume a reverse causality: 
rising deficits of large centers…are assumed to produce rising surpluses in an 
increasing number of periphery countries” (Schnabl/Freitag 2009:14.). They identify 
two types of transmission channels that explain how current account deficits 
(surpluses) in the center are transformed into surpluses (deficits) in the periphery. 
The first channel is a link between the macroeconomic policies of the center and the 
periphery mainly mediated by the exchange rate policies; the second channel 
consists of relative prices that influence the current accounts of exporting and 
importing countries. This paper is concerned with the first channel only. 
 
4. The Facts 
 
There is no quarrel over the described asymmetries between the three global players 
or over the immense accumulation of foreign reserves in China. The question 
discussed here is this: Can the accumulation of dollars and foreign assets in China 
be seen as the result of a higher capital inflow caused by low interest rates in the 
U.S.? A first answer can be found by a simple inspection of the data.   
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Fig. 2:  Target Rates of Fed and PBoC 
 
The interest rates set by the Fed were low compared to those set by the Peoples 
Bank of China (PBoC) before the crisis broke out. On this background it sounds 
plausible that American credit conditions (besides those of other countries such as 
Japan, etc.) fostered capital flows to China. Fig. 3 depicts foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as one indicator of the capital flows to China and the U.S.  
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Fig.3: Foreign direct investment, China and USA, in millions $. 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 3, there was indeed a rising capital flow to China, but this is 
also true for the U.S., at least since 2003. The thesis disputed here is that capital 
flows were redirected from the U.S. to China because of the comparatively low 
interest rates in the U.S. In reality, the opposite was the case. In 2003 the downward 
trend of capital flows to the U.S., which was not caused by declining interest rates, 
but by the events of September 11, 2001, was inverted and this is the opposite 
direction of what is asserted. Moreover, the U.S.-FDI was higher than China’s all the 
time. Of course, this is no surprise. Everybody knows that capital flows to the U.S. 
fuelled the finance and housing bubble that burst in 2007. 
 
There was a steadily growing capital flow to China, too. Looking at Fig. 3, growth 
rates of both flows seem to be inversely linked together. However, the correlation 
between the two variables of –0.16 is statistically not different from zero. If we 
compare Fig. 2 with Fig. 3, there seems to be no sign of a direct causal connection 
between PBoC’s interest rates (as a cause) and the changes of capital inflows to 
China (as the effect), not to mention between PBoC’s interest rates and the capital 
flow to the U.S. Although the target rates of the PBoC were comparatively higher, 
they could not hinder the rising capital flow to the U.S. In addition, there is no visible 
influence exerted by the Fed on the capital flow to China. As can be seen by a 
comparison of the curves of Figures 2 and 3, the swelling capital flow to the U.S. was  
not caused by larger interest rates set by the Fed; instead it was a reaction of the Fed 
to an overheated capital and housing market at home.  
 
The number of observations is too small to carry out reliable statistical tests. In Tab. 1 
the probabilities are reported of testing the hypothesis that the variable x does not 
Granger cause the variable y. The table may be read in the following way: if there is a 
higher probability in cell (yi,xj) than in cell (yj,xi), it is more plausible that xi causes yj 
compared to the hypothesis that xj causes yi. 
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 x FDI_CHN FDI_USA PBoC Fed 
y      
FDI_CHN  -- 0.92 (9) 0.77 (6) 0.86 (6) 
FDI_USA  0.95 (9) -- 0.25 (6) 0.12 (6) 
PBoC  0.20 (6) 0.22 (6) -- 0.51 (6) 
Fed  0.53 (6) 0.75 (6) 0.43 (6) -- 
Tab. 1: Probabilities of the null hypothesis “x does not Granger  
cause y,” number of observations in brackets.  
 
According to these tests, it seems to be the case (i) that the foreign direct investment 
to China influences the target rate of PBoC rather than the other way round, and (ii) 
that interest rates set by the Fed influence FDI to the U.S. rather than inverted. The 
differences of the other comparable cells are too small to make even a tentative 
assertion. As far as the result (ii) can be taken seriously, it is in line with Schnabl’s 
and Freitag’s argument—but the evidence is modest. Similar encouraging results 
may have convinced the authors, that there is a causal relationship. However, there 
is no evidence for the other part of the causal chain: Interest rates of the PBoCh 
seem to have no influence on China’s FDI. 
 
The reason for target rates having only a minor influence on capital flows is simple: 
target rates of central banks are never a direct cause of capital flows. Capital is 
attracted by sufficiently higher funds rates on capital markets. This missing link 
between central banks’ monetary policy and the real movement of capital is not 
mentioned by the authors. It is discussed (among others) by Dooley/Folkerts-
Landau/Garber (2003) and by McKinnon and Schnabl (2009). 
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Fig. 4: LIBOR and interest rates of 1-Y-Deposits China (IR1Y)  
 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2009:1) assert a refusal of China’s industrial corporations 
and financial institutions to invest abroad, because (i) they expect a further 
appreciation of the Renminbi and with it a loss of their foreign investments, and 
because (ii) the U.S. federal funds rate was low. This was true before 2004 and after 
2007 (see Fig. 4), and the question is how the global imbalances that partially caused 
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the crisis can be explained. Taking into account the interest rates of the U.S. that 
where higher than those of China from 2004 to 2007, there was no cause of a 
redirection of the capital flow to China, because the U.S. capital market was much 
more attractive for investors. 
 
As Prof. Schnabl remarked in a personal note to the author, FDI is one of the 
indicators of a country’s capital inflow and only a part of the financial (capital) account 
comprising other components like foreign-owned assets and other investments. In 
looking for empirical evidence of what Schnabl and Freitag could have meant, the 
financial accounts were purged from FDI (see Fig. 5). 
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Fig. 5: Financial Accounts (IMF definition) without FDI, in millions $. 
 
There are two periods in which the reduction of financial inflows to the U.S. is 
connected with an enhanced inflow to China, 2003 and 2006. The downswing 2006 
seems to be linked especially to an upswing of capital flows to China. The problem 
with the redirection thesis is this—the reduction of US$178 billion may have fuelled 
the additional capital flow to China of US$61 billion; but how can this explain the 
global imbalances that emerged years before?   
 
Therefore, a similar conclusion can be drawn from Fig. 5 depicting the financial 
accounts purged from the FDI in China and in the U.S. and including the other 
indicators of capital flows. There were no enhanced capital flows to China on the cost 
of the U.S. which were caused by higher interest rates in China and which would 
have caused the global imbalances. There was no redirection of the capital flows 
away from the U.S. toward China during the years before the crises broke out. As an 
explanation of the causes of the crisis, the redirection thesis is useless. 
 
Curious as it is, the authors know these facts, but do not draw the consequences. For 
instance, instead of a enhanced capital flow to China caused by the allegedly lower 
interest rates in the U.S., the periphery central banks, including PBoC, were 
expanding the “holdings of U.S. and euro area government bonds,” (Schnabl/Freitag 
2009:15) quite the opposite direction of stipulated capital flow.  
 
By the way, the attractiveness of the U.S. capital market was given even in periods 
when interest rates were lower than those in other countries. Dooley, Folkerts-
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Landau, and Garber (2003) offer an explanation for this anomaly. Again,, the 
challenger China plays a crucial role—China’s current account surplus is used by the 
officials to buy U.S. securities without regard to their risk and return characteristics. 
“Their appetite for such investments is, for all practical purposes, unlimited because 
their growth capacity is far from its limit” (Dooley/Folkerts-Landau/Garber 2003:6). In 
other words, export-led growth in China leads to current account surpluses and to 
more capital flows from China to the U.S., just the opposite of the disputed 
proposition. Of course, this is not to say that China is the only one responsible for the 
global imbalances. Beside China, official sectors of Japan and Taiwan plus private 
investors in Europe, Canada and Latin America helped finance the U.S. current 
account deficit. And last but not least, there have been structural and political 
conditions in the U.S. that fostered over-consumption for decades.  
 
5. Once more: The disputed argument 
 
According to the authors, changes in the monetary stance in the U.S. are likely to 
lead, independent from the exchange rate regime, to lower rates in China (and other 
countries of the dollar periphery) for the following reasons: declining interest rates in 
the U.S. are supposed to cause a redirection of capital flows into the periphery; rising 
capital inflows into China and other Asian countries trigger currency purchases by 
periphery central banks; increasing stocks of foreign reserves on the asset side of the 
central bank balance sheet are matched by a proportional increase of reserve money 
on the liability side (Schnabl/Freitag 2009:14). What are the consequences of the 
latter situation related to interest rates whatever the reasons were that led to it?  
 
From the point of view of modern macroeconomic theory, a rising money supply is 
associated with shrinking interest rates, as long as money demand is constant. This 
is in line with an overall view in textbooks (Blanchard 2006:389) and with the authors’ 
argument that interest rates of the periphery converge toward the rates of the center. 
In the case of China a rising money supply matched a rising money demand in an 
emergent market (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003; McKinnon and 
Schnabl 2009:3), and as a consequence the interest rates were lowered only slightly 
one time when the Fed’s interest rates were falling. From 2006 to the mid-2008 the 
PBoC was continuously reacting with adjustments to interest rates to fight inflation.  
 
A look at the monetary policy of the PBoC raises similar questions. If the currency is 
or shall be tightly pegged to the dollar, there is no other way to react to a rising 
capital inflow than to lower interest rates set by the central bank, according to the 
authors (Schnabl and Freitag 2009:15). This measure is thought to dampen the 
capital inflow. On the other side, in front of the danger of an overheating economy 
accompanied by inflation, the central bank should not cut, but enhance interest rates. 
This is exactly what the PBoC was doing.  
 
If central banks do not react to the situation of enhancing capital inflow with an 
appreciation and try to keep the level of their interest rates, appreciation expectations 
reinforce capital inflows. To avoid excessive appreciation, interest rates have to 
change eventually. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the domestic currency will 
be appreciated and exports will tend to decline. The central bank will likely react with 
interest rate cuts—not to ease inflationary and appreciation pressure caused by 
capital inflows (Schnabl and Freitag 2009:15)—but to ease the consequences of 
worse terms of trade.  
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Apparently, the core of the authors’ argument is the magnetic effect of high interest 
rates. There is no doubt that there is such an effect, but it is mediated by the funds 
rates on a capital market. It may well be that lower interest rates attract less foreign 
investment; on the other hand, they spur the domestic economy and this attracts 
more foreign capital by means of higher funds rates. This was the case in China. At 
the same time, the capital inflow to the U.S. was waning and waxing—no redirection 
to China can be observed. If this critique turns out to be correct, other claims made 
by Schnabl and Freitag which are consequences are questionable; for example, that 
fiscal consolidation in periphery countries can be seen as the outcome of low interest 
levels in the center countries (Schnabl and Freitag 2009:12), that interest rates in the 
center are directly translated into interest rates changes of periphery countries 
(Schnabl and Freitag 2009:14), the latter being true only when taken with a pinch of 
salt (Fig. 2). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Let us remember the original focus, the claim to deliver another explanation for the 
global asymmetries of current account deficits and surpluses. The hypothesis of a 
redirected capital flow turned out to be wrong in several respects. After fixing 
indicators in an appropriate way, we could identify periods that confirm the thesis, but 
neither a plausible link to interest rates nor a possible redirection could be interpreted 
as one of the significant causes of the crisis in 2007. Of course, the author of this 
study does not claim to have carried out a proper causal analysis. According to his 
understanding, this would presuppose sufficient high correlations and a theoretical 
backed hypothesis referring to a common cause of the variables explored (Saris and 
Stronkhorst 1984). Both conditions are not in sight. In spite of this, Schnabl and 
Freitag claim to have discovered one of the causes of the global imbalances that 
emerged in the past decade, but regression analysis is not the best method to test 
causal hypotheses. As long as no empirical evidence can be delivered, the 
redirection thesis must be regarded as mere metaphysics.  
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